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Abstract
This paper provides a novel contribution for specifying the role of demand for technological competition. The focus
is on the analysis of the mechanisms of technological learning and spillovers occurring in different structures of
networks of vertically-related industries. The paper offers a detailed and original empirical analysis of technological
competition among suppliers and structure of the network of two vertically related-industries, namely the commercial jet
and turboprop aero-engine and aircraft industries. Technological performances of actors are measured through measures
of output of the technological activity.
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1.  Introduction
This paper contributes to understand the relations between technical progress and vertical
organisation of industries at a micro-level. This allows to propose a novel specification of the role
of demand for technical progress, which is based on the analysis of the mechanisms of technological
learning and spillovers occurring in different structures of networks of vertically-related industries.
The role of demand has been repeatedly emphasised in the literature on technical progress (Dosi,
1982; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984; Lancaster, 1971; see also the special issue of the Journal of
Evolutionary Economics (2001) for recent contributions). However, we believe that the micro-
mechanisms of interactions between suppliers and users of innovations and their impact on
technical progress have not been sufficiently specified and, moreover, have not been dealt with
quantitatively.
In this paper we propose that the structure of the network of relations between producers and
users of innovations affects the nature (speed and variety) of the learning processes of firms and
technological competition among players, their technological performances and the rate of technical
progress. We claim that the processes of technological learning, spillover and competition, which
are characteristics of different levels of cohesion of the network, affects the rate of technological
competition among actors.
The paper reviews the literature on measurement of technical progress, emphasising the relevant
indicators for studying technological competition among actors based on technological output
indicators. A detailed and original empirical analysis is developed to explore the hypothesis of
different dynamics of technological competition in different structures of networks of vertically
related-industries. The objects of the empirical analysis are the commercial jet and turboprop aero-
engine and aircraft industries, respectively from 1958 to 1997 and from 1948 to 1997.
Data on technical parameters on the supply side have been used to obtain a segmentation of the
market into three product classes in the jet and two product classes in the turboprop. Segmentation
has been defined through cluster analysis, and has been supported by qualitative information drawn
from specialised press, interviews with technical experts, company reports and publications on the
history and structure of the aviation industry. Within each cluster technometric indicators (Grupp,
1998) have been computed to identify the technological trajectories at the industry level and the
position of firms along the technological frontier.
The empirical analysis support the hypothesis of a more intense technological competition in the
core of hierarchical networks. Competition is characterised by the absence of a single technological3
leader and by the substitutions of leaders over time, which is more rapid in cohesive sub-groups. On
the contrary in partitioned networks, technological competition is weaker and different companies
can survive in the market and occupy important positions in terms of market shares, while following
parallel technological trajectories.
2.  Vertical structure of the market and technical progress
This work draws from contributions on technical progress and technological trajectories, learning
and interaction among heterogeneous agents (Dosi, 1982, 1988; Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1993;
Cohendet, 1993; Lundvall, 1993; Llerena and Oltra, 2000), and further extends the idea that the
emergence and the evolution of technological trajectories depends on learning processes among
suppliers and users.
The paper also proposes to analyse quantitatively the micro-mechanisms of interactions between
suppliers and users and the technological competition among suppliers by focusing on direct
measures of output of the technological activity. This allows to avoid limitations of input indicators
such as R&D investments, or intermediate input such as patents, which have been the basis of many
theoretical game-based models of technological competition (for a survey see Reinganum, 1989).
As it has been argued by Dosi (1988), “technological progress proceeds through the development
of both public elements of knowledge, shared by all actors involved in a certain activity, and
private, local, partly tacit, firm-specific, cumulative forms of knowledge”.
In the context of private forms of knowledge and local nature of learning, we believe that the
structure of the network of relations between producers and users of innovations affects the nature
(speed and variety) of the learning processes of firms, their technological performances and the rate
of technological progress. It has also been suggested that the use of vertically-related sectors as
object of the analysis allows the understanding of (i) transmission of demand and technological
impulses between agents that might not have competitive interactions; (ii) processes of innovation
and diffusion (Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1993). We believe that the structure of vertically-related
sectors shapes the nature of the above processes.
The concept of learning can be usefully analysed by focusing on different factors: interactions
between buyers and suppliers, length of the interaction, heterogeneity of relations. The heterogeneity
of relations is particularly important when the object of the transaction between buyers and suppliers
is a complex product such as the aero-engine. In a complex product, technological efforts may be
devoted to different directions. Technological trade-offs may lead to different emphasis on different
solutions. Moreover, customers may have differentiated requirements which can be met with4
idiosyncratic solutions. Heterogeneity of relations represent therefore an opportunity for suppliers of
learning by exploring the space of possible technological solutions in multiple directions dictated by
customers.
In this work we claim that the processes of technological learning, spillover and competition,
which are characteristics of different levels of cohesion of the network (partitioned versus
hierarchical), affects the technological competition among suppliers.
Different network structures shape the actual possibility of actors for learning by interacting with
single or multiple actors. Taking two extreme cases, in hierarchical networks, composed of a core
and a periphery, suppliers in the core accumulate technological knowledge by supplying a number
of customers; on the other hand, customers related to multiple suppliers learn by using different
products of heterogeneous actors. By contrast, in partitioned networks, relations are mainly one-to-
one and suppliers learn from a single buyer (and viceversa).
Moreover, in hierarchical networks learning externalities and spillovers are more relevant with
respect to partitioned networks. In fact, within a core of highly connected buyers and suppliers,
spillovers increase with the number of common customers/suppliers for a number of reasons:
-  within a core a customer with multiple sourcing improves its specification capability with
advantages for all its suppliers;
-  innovation from a supplier stimulates the customer to require similar innovations from the
other suppliers;
-  suppliers with similar positions and technological characteristics have a higher probability of
imitating the innovating actors.
Finally, within a core of suppliers related to the same group of customers, it is very likely to
observe an intense competition.
The paper aims to show that:
1.  when the network is hierarchical (composed of a core and a periphery) the formation of the core
leads to: equalisation of technical and market opportunities through access to the same
customers, various forms of learning by interacting with heterogeneous actors, intense
competition and rapid technical progress;
2.  in the periphery actors have a higher probability of learning by interacting (imitating) with (from)
the core when the technological distance is lower; when technological distance is higher the
probability of imitation is lower and decrease further if actors have no relations with the core.
They are active in isolated niches of the market where the rate of technical progress is slower;5
3.  when the network is partitioned cumulative learning in single relations leads to different
solutions to technical problems in different couples of vertically-related firms. The opportunities
for interaction and spillovers are limited, competition is weaker and the rate of technological
progress is slower.
Next section describes the methodologies used in the empirical analysis. Specifically, it reviews
the literature on measurement of technical progress, by highlighting the indicators allowing direct
measures of technical progress and the technological position of actors. It also describes the
measures of vertical networks drawn from social network analysis. Section 4 presents data on the
aero-engine and aircraft industries and the statistical analysis for classifying products in clusters on
the basis of their technical characteristics. Section 5 discusses the results of the empirical analysis,
by linking vertical networks and technometric analysis. Finally section 5 concludes and proposes
lines for further research.
3.  Measuring technical progress and vertical networks
3.1  Measuring technical progress
The problem of measurement of technical progress and technological positions of firms has a
long history and has been tackled by a number of contributions within different approaches. This
section discusses some of the contributions attempting to measuring directly the output of
innovative activity with the objective of finding appropriate measures of technical frontiers and of
technological positions of actors.
In the neoclassical perspective, technical progress was introduced through measures of
productivity, which are very far from direct measures of technological attributes of products and
from customer perception of technological performance. We share the belief that the relevant object
of analysis of technological innovation is the product, as composed of a number of characteristics
evolving over time (Lancaster, 1971; Sahal, 1985; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984; Trajtenberg, 1990;
Grupp, 1998). Innovation on products occurs by improvement (change in the type or value) of their
technical characteristic, or by introduction of new characteristics.
The emphasis on the characteristics of products has been introduced within characteristic
approach and the Hedonic price method (Lancaster, 1971, 1975; Griliches, 1971), in which it is
developed the concept that products are a bundle of characteristics and consumers choose
characteristics instead of products. Utility functions have characteristics and not products as
arguments. According to this view, the benefit of characteristics for consumers are detected through6
regression models measuring the contribution of technical characteristics to the formation of
product prices. On this basis, Trajtenberg (1990) developed a model for studying product innovation
in the CT scanners industry.
However, the use of price for estimating the weight of characteristics presents some difficulties:
the approach is based on the assumption that the market is competitive, but in a number of
industries price is not determined by the free interplay of supply and demand (Sahal, 1985); data on
prices are not always publicly disclosed, and even in the case in which price lists are available, the
price of a specific product can change over time (for example because of cost reductions)
determining uncertainty in the selection of data. Moreover, the use of economic variables in the
evaluation of technical attributes does not allow the “pure” measurement of technology advance
(Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984).
Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) proposed a useful distinction of product characteristics taking into
account the supply and the demand side of the market in technical characteristics, incorporated in a
product supplied for performing some functions, and service  characteristics, that is the
performances required by users of the product. The product is described by technical and service
characteristics and by the mapping between the two. More recent contributions use measures of
diversity (entropy measure, Weitzman’s measure) using data on technical and service characteristics
to measure the emergence of new product niches as an indicator of technical progress (Saviotti,
1996; Frenken et al., 1999, 2000). These measures allow the identification of dominant design and
product differentiation at the industry level, but are not used to detect technological frontiers and
positions of actors.
A few contributions develop technometric measures based on various multi-dimensional
functions linking technical parameters for the analysis of technological progress (Sahal, 1985;
Dodson, 1985; Martino, 1985), but do not address the analysis of technological competition among
actors.
Simpler technometric indicators are proposed by Grupp (1998) to measure directly technical
progress. Each product in a market segment is represented by a k-tuple of technical characteristics at
time  t  which is compared with other k-tuples for other products. In each cluster and for each
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k K is the best value of k at time t0 across all firms j.
The T index is 0 when the firm is positioned on the minimum level of the previous period; T is
equal 1 if the firm is on the frontier of the previous year; T greater than 1 indicates that the firm has
shifted the frontier while T lower than 1 indicates that the firm is below the frontier of the previous
year. At t0 the index is static (i.e. it is calculated taking the value of the firm in t0), and represents the
firm’s position at the time it enters the industry or the product group.
We use this index with the assumption that new characteristics or improvements of technical
characteristics are introduced after a process of problem solving of techno-economic trade-offs
involving users and producers. User-producer interactions allow the suppliers to develop technical
attributes which meet performance characteristics required by customers. The problem we address
through the analysis of the structure of the network of vertical relations is to understand and
measure how the structure of vertical relations between buyers and suppliers affect the rate of
technological progress and the intensity of technological competition.
The advantages of this technometric indicator are the following:
-  it is dimensionless;
-  it is observable over a period of time for detecting technical progress;
-  it allows the identification of brands and firms for the analysis of technological positions of
actors along the frontier
-  it can be used as a simple and direct measure of technical progress, by replacing at the
numerator in the formula 
t
jk K  by 
t
k Kmax . In this case a value of the index greater than one
indicates technical progress.
Another advantage in using technical parameters of products with respect to other measures of
innovation such as patents, is that they allow the identification of technological trajectories and their
evolution over time through indicators of output of the innovative activity, which is directly related
to the product and not only to technological competencies of firms.
The main problem of this indicator is related to the aggregation of the indexes for each
characteristic at the firm or at the product/brand level and the consideration of trade-offs among
characteristics. Because the index is dimensionless, weighted averages of the indexes could be a8
solution. A careful process in the determination of the weights and trade-offs is necessary for
reducing the subjectivity of the analysis. This process should involve technical experts and
customers.
3.2  Measuring vertical networks
Network analysis has been applied in many fields of social sciences, including economics,
sociology, and organisation, for analysing different structures of interactions among agents
(individuals, firms, groups of actors, technical artefacts). In the analysis of industries, network
concepts and techniques are increasingly used in the field of inter-firm agreements (joint ventures,
licensing, technological alliances, consortia and the like) (Powell, 1996; Orsenigo et al, 1998,
2001). We apply network analysis to the study of vertical relations between buyers and suppliers.
The network may assume different topologies which can be represented by different network
measures. For the purposes of this study, we analyse three structural properties of the network: the
relational intensity, the distribution of the relations across actors and the position of actors in the
network
1.
For the analysis of vertically-related industries we study bipartite graphs, in which links connect
vertices from different sets of actors (buyers and suppliers) and there are no links within each set
(Borgatti and Everett, 1997; Asratian et al., 1999). The links in the network are determined by the
order of an engine placed by an aircraft company to an aero-engine manufacturer at a given date.
The structure of the relations is represented for each year by a biadjacency matrix, whose cells
represent the binary variable “a link exists / does not exist”.
We selected the following network measures to study the structural properties of the network:
centrality degree, density, k-core
2.
At the actor level we compute measures of centrality degree. The degree of an actor is defined as
the number of links incident with that vertex. The total number of links depends on the network
size, that is, on the total number of actors. We normalise the degree for obtaining a more
informative index, dividing the degree by the total number of connections occurring in the network.
This index seizes on the comparison of the relational intensity among the actors, by measuring the
share of total relations in which each actor is involved.
The density is essentially a count of the number of links actually present in a graph, divided by
the maximum possible number of links in a graph of the same size. Density is a synthetic measure
                                                
1 The network methodology exposed in this section has been drawn from previous papers where it is developed more extensively
(Bonaccorsi Giuri 2001a, 2001b).
2 Measures of density and k-cores, bi-components and cut-points are computed by using the software Ucinet 5 (Borgatti et al., 1999).9
of network structure which provides information about the group relational intensity and the
cohesion of a graph, but does not include information about the variability among actor degrees.
We also calculate a measure at the sub-graph level, to analyse the distribution of the relations
across actors. In particular we study the number and size of k-cores, which allow to detect the
presence of cohesive sub-groups. A k-core is a connected maximal induced sub-graph which has
minimum degree greater than or equal to k (Wasserman and Faust, 1995). Each member of a k-core
is related to at least k other actors on the other set.  We calculate the number of k-cores in the
network for every possible value of k and for each year of their life.
For k=1 the number of cores indicates the degree of partition of a network. The higher the
number, the higher the degree of partition of the network, as the network can be separated in sub-
graphs without deleting any vertex. Intuitively, a partitioned network is composed of isolated sub-
groups of vertically-related actors.
The presence of cores with degree greater than or equal to k denotes cohesiveness of a graph, that
is the distribution of relations across actors is not dispersed but is concentrated in sub-groups of
intensely connected actors. In particular, a network characterised by a connected core and a
periphery of disconnected actors can be defined as hierarchical
3.
4.  The aero-engine industry
4.1  Data
The objects of the empirical analysis are the commercial turboprop and jet aero-engine industries
since their birth, respectively in 1948 and 1958 to 1997. The choice of the aero-engine industry has
a number of reasons:
-  well-defined brands and generation of products;
-  availability of complete directory of data;
-  existence of a stable set of technical and performance characteristics representing the product
over the history of the industry;
-  well-defined vertically-related objects (aero-engines and aircraft) and firms (buyer and
suppliers are always separated firms, as no vertical integration occurs in the industry).
The empirical analysis is based on two databases.
The Atlas Aviation Database contains all transactions (orders) occurring from 1948 to 1997
between engine manufacturers, aircraft manufacturers and airline companies in the market for10
commercial jet and turboprop aircraft. For each transaction the aircraft and engine product version is
specified. These data are used for calculating measures of structure of the network of vertically-
related firms and measures of position of actors in the network. The unit of analysis is the
transaction of engines occurring between an engine and an aircraft manufacturer each year.
The  AirTech  database contains 16 technical parameters for 114 jet engine versions and 11
technical parameters for 76 turboprop engine versions and two basic parameters for each aircraft
included in the Atlas database (Table 1). The AirTech database has been built by using several
sources of data: Jane’s All the World Aircraft 1950-1998,  Jane’s Aero-engines 1997,  Flight
International  1970-2000,  Aviation Week and Space Technology 1970-2000, engine and aircraft
companies web sites, company reports, product brochures, technical data provided by a major
airline company, phone contacts with technical and information offices of two of the larger aero-
engine companies.
Further information and details have been drawn from publications on the history of the aviation
technology and on the structure of the aircraft and aero-engine industries (among others Miller and
Sawers, 1968; Phillips, 1971; Constant, 1980; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982; Vincenti, 1990;
Garvin, 1998).
From the list of parameters exhibited in Table 1 we selected for the jet 5 technical characteristics
(weight, length, diameter, thrust, airflow) and 3 technical performance parameters (BPR, OPR,
SFC), or service characteristics with the terminology of Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984), whose
direction of advance is clearly defined for the overall industry (BPR, OPR) and for each segment
(SFC). In the turboprop we selected 4 technical characteristics (weight, lenght, width, power) and 2
technical performance parameters (Pressure ratio, SFC). The choice of technical parameters and the
distinction in characteristics and performance parameters has been validated through interviews
with aeronautical engineers and with managers of the purchasing division of a major airline
company
4. Descriptive statistics on the characteristics are reported in Appendix1, Table A1.
In other works technical and service characteristics are used to study the evolution of variety in
industries and the emergence of dominant designs and product differentiation at the industry level
(Saviotti, 1996; Frenken et al., 2000). We use cluster analysis for classifying firms and products
within product classes with the aim of identifying technological frontiers and position of firms along
the frontier.
                                                                                                                                                            
3 The notion of hierarchy in vertical networks is different from a tree-structure of relations among actors which is not characteristic
of networks connecting two sets of actors. In this case a hierarchical network denotes the presence of a inner core  and a periphery,
both composed of actors from the two sets, i.e. buyers and suppliers.
4 Some of them, like thrust, can be difficult to classify because they can be considered technical or performance characteristics,
depending on the level of education of customers.11
Table 1. List of product characteristics
Industry Type of characteristics Characteristics
JET
Aero-engine Technical Compressor
Aero-engine Technical Engine type (output)
Aero-engine Technical Combustor type
Aero-engine Technical N° fans
Aero-engine Technical N° LP compressors
Aero-engine Technical N° HP compressors
Aero-engine Technical N° of turbines
Aero-engine Technical N° HP turbines
Aero-engine Technical Air flow - lb/sec
Aero-engine Technical Length – inch
Aero-engine Technical Diameter – inch
Aero-engine Technical Weight-dry  - lb
Aero-engine Technical Thrust TO – lb
Aero-engine Service BPR (By pass ratio)
Aero-engine Service OPR (Overall pressure ratio)
Aero-engine Service SFC (Specific Fuel Consumption) TO - lb/hr/lb
Aircraft Service Seats
Aircraft Service Range – nm
TURBOPROP
Aero-engine Technical Compressor
Aero-engine Technical Engine type
Aero-engine Technical Combustor type
Aero-engine Technical Number of turbine
Aero-engine Technical Prop drive
Aero-engine Technical Fan/compressor
Aero-engine Technical Length - inch
Aero-engine Technical Width – inch
Aero-engine Technical Weight–dry – lb
Aero-engine Technical Power T-O – ehp
Aero-engine Service Pressure ratio at max power
Aero-engine Service SFC (Specific fuel consumption) T-O - lb/h/ehp
Aircraft Service Seats
Aircraft Service Range - nm
In the jet, data on the selected 5 technical characteristics of aero-engines have been used to obtain
a segmentation of the industry by classifying 114 engine products into three sub-groups through
cluster analysis. In the turboprop 76 engine products have been classified in two sub-groups. The
variables have been previously standardised for avoiding effects of the choice of the units of
measures in the determination of the clusters.
Cluster analysis can be carried out with two methodologies: hierarchical and partitioning
(Kaufman and Rouseeuw, 1990; Everitt, 1993). We apply hierarchical clustering because it is more
appropriate when the number of observations is not very large (less than 200). Within hierarchical
clustering, we used the agglomerative technique of classification of data. It is an iterative procedure
used to identify relatively homogeneous groups of cases based on the selected characteristics, using
an algorithm that starts with each case in a separate cluster and agglomerates clusters step by step12
until only one is left. The possible methods of aggregation are based on different measures of
distance between observations and groups. The choice of the method depends on the expected
equality or inequality of size and variance of clusters and on the expected shape of clusters
(spherical or elongated). We used the complete linkage method (also known as furthest neighbour)
because of the different size and variance of clusters and of the roughly spherical shape of clusters.
The dissimilarity between groups is defined by the largest distance between cases of two clusters.
The determination of the number of clusters in the jet has been based on tests of the ANOVA for
variables with approximately normal distribution and homogeneity of variance between groups
(LENGHT) and non homogeneity of variance (DIAMETER). For variables with non normal
distribution (WEIGHT, AIRFLOW AND THRUST) we used the non parametric Kruskal Wallis test
to verify the presence of significant differences between the means of clusters. All tests supported
the grouping of observations in three clusters (see in Appendix 1, Table A2 for the classification of
engines in clusters and Table A3 for descriptive statistics of the service characteristics of products
within clusters). Cluster 1 represents the smaller segment of the market, including the first turbojets
introduced at the birth of the industry, the turbofans introduced at the beginning of the 1960’s in
substitution of the turbojets, the second generation of turbofans and the small regional jets of the
1990’s. Cluster 2 includes larger size-engines while cluster 3 includes the largest engines of the
three big players, which power very large aircraft.
The size of each cluster in terms of market shares is shown in Figure 1.































































































In the turboprop the determination of the number of clusters has been based on ANOVA and T
test (equivalent to ANOVA for two independent samples) for variables with approximately normal
distribution and homogeneity of variance between groups (WEIGHT). For variables with non
normal distribution (length, width, thrust) we used the non parametric Kruskal Wallis and Mann-
Withney test (equivalent to Kruskal Wallis test for two independent samples) to verify the presence
of significant difference between the means of clusters. ANOVA and Kruskal Wallis tests did not
provide significant results for a classification of engines in more than two clusters, while all other
tests supported the grouping of observations in two clusters (the classification of engines in clusters
and the descriptive statistics of SFC and PR within clusters are reported in Appendix 1, Table A2
and A4).
Cluster 1 includes all engine powering regional aircraft with more than 50 seats, while cluster 2
groups engines for smaller aircraft. It experienced a rapid growth during the 1980s, when the air
transport deregulation fuelled the growth of the smaller size of the turboprop regional market
(Meyer and Oster, 1984; Bailey et al, 1985; Button and Stough, 2000). Conversely, cluster 1
witnessed a decline of its market share with respect of cluster 2, also because of the recent
appearance of small jets in the regional market.


















































































This classification of engines within clusters has been supported by qualitative information
drawn from specialised press, company reports and publications on the history and structure of the
aviation industry, and validated through interviews with technical experts.14
Within each segment the technometric indicators T of technical progress developed by Grupp
(1998) have been computed to identify technological trajectories for OPR, BPR and SFC at the jet
industry level, and for PR and SFC at the turboprop industry level, while indicators of progress and
positions of actors along the technological frontiers have been computed within each segment for
these performance parameters.
Data on technical parameters were available as attributes of the product versions, whose date of
introduction and sales were also available. Their observation over time has been obtained by
referring to the existence in life of an engine (as indicated by the presence in the fleets of airlines).
We preferred to consider the existence in fleet than the date of introduction of the product or the
date of sales of the product for studying the technical progress, as it is more continuous and does not
depend on purchasing decisions which occur at discrete points in time. In fact, the introduction of
new products at a time t is an innovation that may move the frontier upwards, but the existence of
the product in fleets allows the persistence of the data over time.
5.  Empirical analysis
5.1  The jet industry
This section presents the result of the empirical analysis in the jet aero-engine industries and
provide a discussion of the hypothesis through the mapping of the technometric analysis on the
network structure and evolution over time.
It is important to specify that the analysis of the network has been carried out at the industry
level, while the technometric analysis at the product class level, as resulted by the statistical cluster
analysis. Product classes are not independent, as companies operating in more than one product
class enjoy economies of scope and economies of learning. The assumption is that the analysis of
network at the product class level would neglect those economies at the total industry level. On the
contrary, with respect to the technometric analysis, the separation in segment is needed because of
their technological diversity. In fact, technological constraints related to the size of the engines lead
to the existence of technological frontiers at the segment level. Table 2 synthesises the presence of
companies in the product classes. All companies are present in cluster 1, while only Pratt &
Whitney, Rolls Royce and General Electric developed engines of larger size, competing in the other
two segments.
In this section we discuss the empirical analysis with the hypothesis that the structure of the
overall network and the central position of actors in the network affect the technological
competition at the supplier level.15
Table 2. Firms in clusters
Industry Label Firm CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3
Aero-engine AE Allison    
CI CFM International    
GE General Electric          
IA International AeroEngines    
PW Pratt & Whitney          
RR Rolls Royce          
TX Textron    
Aircraft ARO Aerospatiale (-Alenia)    
AIR Airbus          
COM Comet    
BOE Boeing          
BOM Bombardier    
BAE British Aerospace    
DAS Dasa    
EMB Embraer    
FOK Fokker    
HAW Hawker Siddeley    
LOC Lockheed       
MDC Mc Donnell Douglas       
ROM Rombac    
VFW VFW    
VIC Vickers    
Table 3 summarises the network measures at the group, sub-group and actor level for each year
of the period, while the network structure in the jet industry at 4 dates (1960-1970-1985-1997) is
shown in Figure 3. The measures showed in Table 3 are number of actors (actors), level of
relational density of the network (density), number of k-cores with k=1 (1-core), number of k-cores
with k=2 (2-core), number of vertices in the core with k=2 (2-core size), normalised centrality
degree of actors for the aero-engine firms (AE centr., CI centr…).
At the aggregate level, we observe that the level of density in the jet is oscillating over time,
depending on the entry of actors with a small number of relations (declining pattern) and on the
increasing relational intensity among established buyers and suppliers (growing pattern). The
analysis at the sub-graph level provides details on the distribution of relations across sub-groups of
actors. In particular, it gives evidence of the degree of partition and of the formation of a
hierarchical structure of the network.
The network is composed of only one or two sub-graphs over all its life, except in the last three
years, in which there are three 1-cores, and the larger partition is composed of 10 firms operating in
all three clusters. The other two partitions are two pairs of vertically-related firms in the market for
small regional jets, which are part of cluster 1.
The number of 2-cores denotes the degree of hierarchisation of the network. The network
assumes a hierarchical configuration as it is possible to identify a cohesive core in which the actors
have degree greater than or equal to 2. The core emerged during the first stage of the industry life
and was initially composed of 4 actors in cluster 1 (shaded area in figure 5, 1960). The entry of new16
actors at the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s destabilised the network and the
core. The intensification of the relational activities of entrants and incumbents led again to the
emergence of a core which expanded during the industry evolution. In fact, as evident from the
table, the number of actors grew from 4 in 1975 to 8 in 1997, therefore a larger part of actors
entered the core. The core was composed of incumbent engine suppliers in clusters 1, 2 and 3 and of
major aircraft manufacturers operating in multiple sourcing. On the other hand, a periphery was also
created in the network, which was composed of actors with degree equal to 1, that is aircraft
manufacturers in single sourcing and engine suppliers in the regional market, all operating in cluster
1. The network was also partitioned in the last three years, as there were three subgroups, two of
them in the regional market (Allison-Embraer and Textron-British Aerospace), and the other
containing the 2-core.
The normalised centrality degrees show that the first movers Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney,
former relational leaders, lose their central positions while maintaining a high number of relations.
This is due to the increasing centrality of other actors which also join the core. In the last two
decades the positions of actors in the core tend to equalise, while a smaller value is observed for
actors at the periphery.






































Table 3. Network measures




















1958 4 0.50 2 - - 0.00 0.50 0.50
1959 6 0.50 2 - - 0.00 0.50 0.50
1960 8 0.47 2 1 4 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.57
1961 8 0.47 2 1 4 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.57
1962 8 0.53 2 1 5 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.50
1963 10 0.43 2 1 4 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.67
1964 11 0.42 2 1 4 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.60
1965 10 0.43 2 1 4 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.56
1966 8 0.67 1 1 4 0.00 0.38 0.63
1967 10 0.48 1 1 4 0.10 0.30 0.60
1968 10 0.43 1 1 4 0.11 0.33 0.56
1969 10 0.43 1 - - 0.11 0.33 0.56
1970 11 0.36 1 - - 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.50
1971 10 0.38 2 - - 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.38
1972 12 0.36 2 - - 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.50
1973 13 0.38 2 - - 0.22 0.33 0.44
1974 13 0.38 2 - - 0.22 0.33 0.44
1975 13 0.38 2 1 4 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.42
1976 12 0.42 2 1 4 0.30 0.20 0.50
1977 12 0.46 1 1 6 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.46
1978 12 0.43 1 1 4 0.08 0.25 0.17 0.50
1979 10 0.51 1 1 4 0.11 0.33 0.22 0.33
1980 10 0.52 1 1 5 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.36
1981 11 0.44 1 1 5 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.08
1982 12 0.41 1 1 5 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.38 0.08
1983 12 0.35 2 1 4 0.09 0.27 0.18 0.36 0.09
1984 12 0.44 1 1 5 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.08
1985 12 0.36 2 1 5 0.08 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.08
1986 12 0.35 2 1 4 0.09 0.27 0.18 0.36 0.09
1987 11 0.44 2 1 6 0.17 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.08
1988 11 0.49 2 1 6 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.09
1989 12 0.49 2 1 6 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.25 0.17 0.08
1990 12 0.44 2 1 6 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.08
1991 11 0.49 2 1 6 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.25 0.17 0.08
1992 12 0.44 2 1 6 0.15 0.31 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.08
1993 12 0.44 2 1 6 0.15 0.31 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.08
1994 12 0.44 2 1 6 0.15 0.31 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.08
1995 14 0.39 3 1 8 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.06
1996 14 0.39 3 1 8 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.06
1997 14 0.39 3 1 8 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.06
Figures 4a,b,c depict the frontier at the industry level and at the firm level for the three technical
performance parameters BPR, OPR and SFC
5. The values represent the maximum reached by the
firms at each year of the period, and the industry frontier is the absolute maximum value observed
each year. In the case of SFC the frontier is the minimum absolute value. However, the values of
                                                
5 Technical data for General Electric from 1960 to 1965 are not available. We could find data on technical parameters but not on the
presence of its engines in fleets, as they were not present in the Atlas Aviation Database. However from other sources we found that
the engine was sold in a very small number of units and for a short period of time, and the interruption of the production was
followed by the exit of the producer from the commercial market.18
SFC at the overall industry level cannot be considered a proper frontier, because the level of specific
fuel consumption is dependent on the product classes. Figure 3c represents therefore a statistics of
the minimum level at an aggregate level.
At this aggregate level of industry the graphs suggest that technological innovations occur quite
discontinuously, and are introduced by different actors over time. Once a shift of the frontier occurs,
all follower approach the frontier with differentiated lags. In some cases firms never approach the
frontier, maintaining isolated patterns, as for example for Allison and Textron, operating at the
periphery of the network.












































































































































































































































































































The technological competition at the segment level is analysed through the computation of the
index T for each parameter at the firm level for every year of the period analysed (see Figures 5a and
5b). T values greater than one point out shifts of the frontier, while T values lower than one indicate
that the companies are below the frontier of the previous period.
In cluster 1 technological advances are introduced by different companies over time. Rolls Royce
and Pratt & Whitney were on the frontier until the beginning of the 1970s. Subsequently major
technological innovations have been introduced by CFM International and by International
Aeroengines, while the distance from the frontier of the other actors increased. Textron is positioned
well below the frontier, confirming the independent patterns of technological evolution and
competition at the periphery of the network, already observed at an aggregate level. In this work we
are studying in detail the frontier for single parameters, without considering trade-offs or correlation
among them. The determination of the weights of the parameters through interviews with expert of
the supply and of the demand side of the industry, and the estimation of a multi-parameter frontier is
the object of an ongoing research. However, the analysis for single parameters has the advantage of
showing in detail the different solutions introduced by suppliers, which result in improvements of
different parameters according to the specific requirements of customers and the specific learning
path of suppliers.
Cluster 2 is characterised by a number of jumps in the frontier most of them introduced by
General Electric. Rolls Royce introduce innovations in BPR and OPR in the same year as General
Electric. T values are greater than one but lower than the values reached by General Electric. In SFC
we observe the substitution of the technological leaders (GE and RR). Pratt & Whitney is a follower
in this cluster. T values reach the minimum levels in all three parameters and tend to approach the
frontier in the last two years.
Cluster 3 is very interesting as it shows changes of technological leadership between all three
players in each characteristics. In BPR the sequence is PW-GE-PW, in OPR is PW-GE-PW-RR, in
SFC it is PW-RR with an innovation of GE with T-value greater than one but lower than RR.
Technological competition is clearly very intense as there is no single technological leader. The
characteristics of interactive learning and learning from heterogeneity within the core of the network
confirm that there are different solutions to idiosyncratic requirements of customers. In fact,
innovations occurs over time in different parameters by different companies. Suppliers solve
differently technological trade-offs depending on their positions and on the position of customers. In
fact, if also the customer is central in the network, its specification capabilities increase and the
possibilities of spillovers among suppliers through common customers increase as well.21
When learning is interactive and depends on the specific buyer-supplier relations, heterogeneity
of relations multiply the opportunities for learning and introducing new technological solutions,
which may be different among players because of the different specific requirements. At the same
time, all suppliers have to follow innovation by competitors to stay on the market.
Technological leadership is not only dependent on time, but on time and relational position. This
is evident by observing the lost of the leadership of RR and PW in cluster 1.
At the periphery of the network we observe that Allison and Textron in cluster 1 follow separated
trajectories. They are always below the frontier but this suggests that they compete in isolated niches
of the market. It is also interesting to note that Rolls Royce, one of the former leaders in cluster 1, in
1970 has a number of relations with customers in single sourcing and in 1980 is out of the core,
being its customers at the periphery except Boeing. This suggests the opportunities of learning from
heterogeneity, but also a fragmentation of efforts in different relations, where customers in single
sourcing are not “experienced”, do not act as bridges for spillovers of knowledge and do not
incentive competition among suppliers.22
Figure 5a. Index T – cluster 1, cluster 2



























































































Figure 5b. Index T – cluster 3









































5.2  The turboprop industry
The turboprop industry presents some interesting differences with respect to the jet industry.
According to the previous analysis, the industry is composed of two product classes. Table 4
shows the presence of aircraft and aero-engine firms in clusters. Except for General Electric and
Pratt & Whitney, all aero-engine companies operate in only one product group. In the aircraft
industry 6 out of 20 firms operate in two market segments.24
Table 4. Firms in clusters
Industry Label Firm CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2
Aero-engine AE Allison 
GA Garrett 
GE General Electric 
PW Pratt & Witney 




Aircraft ARO Aerospatiale (-Alenia) 








HAN HP Herald 









YUN Yunshuji Xian 
With respect to the structure of the network (figure 6, table 5), in the turboprop industry:
-  the level of relational density is lower than in the jet;
-  the degree of partition of the network is higher (the number of 1-cores is 6 in 1977), although
reducing in the last two decades;
-  the network is not hierarchical, as a 2-core composed of 4 actors emerges in 1991 and
dissolves in 1995 and there are not other evidences of a formation of a sub-group of
connected actors;
-  relations among actors are mainly one-to one and sparse;
-  on the supply side there is always a relational reader. The level of actor centrality shows in
fact for Rolls Royce, the first mover in cluster 1, a very high but declining trend over time,
while for Pratt & Whitney, operating mainly in cluster 2, a  growing level of centrality;
-  on the demand side there are not relational leaders, and customers of relational leaders are
mainly in single sourcing.25
Table 5. Network measures




















1953 2 1 , 0 01------1--
1954 2 0 , 5 01------1--
1955 5 1,00 2 - - 0,33 - - - 0,67 - -
1956 6 0,50 1 - - 0,00 - - - 1,00 - -
1957 7 0,50 2 - - 0,33 - - - 0,67 - -
1958 8 0,50 2 - - 0,20 - - - 0,80 - -
1959 8 0,50 2 - - 0,20 - - - 0,80 - -
1960 8 0,50 2 - - 0,40 - - - 0,60 - -
1961 8 0,58 2 - - 0,33 - - - 0,67 - -
1962 9 0,33 2 - - 0,29 - - - 0,71 - -
1963 11 0,38 3 - - 0,25 - - - 0,63 0,13 -
1964 10 0,25 2 - - 0,13 - - - 0,75 0,13 -
1965 13 0,31 3 - - 0,10 - 0,10 0,10 0,60 0,10 -
1966 13 0,29 2 - - 0,10 - 0,00 0,20 0,60 0,10 -
1967 13 0,28 2 - - 0,10 - 0,10 0,20 0,50 0,10 -
1968 13 0,26 2 - - 0,09 - 0,09 0,18 0,55 0,09 -
1969 12 0,30 3 - - 0,11 - 0,11 0,22 0,44 0,11 -
1970 10 0,29 3 - - - - 0,17 0,17 0,50 0,17 -
1971 10 0,23 3 - - - - 0,14 0,14 0,57 0,14 -
1972 13 0,25 4 - - - - 0,11 0,22 0,44 0,11 -
1973 13 0,25 4 - - - - - 0,29 0,43 0,14 -
1974 15 0,20 4 - - - 0,13 - 0,25 0,50 0,13 -
1975 15 0,21 5 - - - 0,11 - 0,33 0,33 0,11 -
1976 14 0,16 4 - - - 0,10 0,10 0,40 0,20 0,10 -
1977 16 0,23 6 - - 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,36 0,18 0,09 -
1978 14 0,23 4 - - 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,38 0,25 - -
1979 13 0,29 4 - - - 0,13 0,13 0,38 0,25 - -
1980 13 0,28 3 - - - 0,14 0,14 0,43 0,29 - -
1981 14 0,24 3 - - - 0,22 0,11 0,44 0,22 - -
1982 16 0,22 3 - - - 0,25 0,08 0,33 0,25 - 0,08
1983 17 0,16 4 - - - 0,27 0,09 0,36 0,18 - 0,09
1984 21 0,21 5 - - - 0,19 0,06 0,44 0,13 - 0,06
1985 21 0,22 3 - - - 0,19 0,13 0,44 0,13 - 0,06
1986 21 0,27 2 - - - 0,19 0,19 0,44 0,06 - 0,06
1987 21 0,22 1 - - - 0,20 0,20 0,47 0,07 - 0,00
1988 21 0,21 2 - - - 0,18 0,18 0,47 0,06 - 0,06
1989 19 0,21 3 - - - 0,19 0,13 0,50 - - 0,06
1990 19 0,24 3 - - - 0,19 0,13 0,50 - - 0,06
1991 20 0,22 2 1 4 0,06 0,18 0,12 0,53 - - 0,06
1992 19 0,34 3 1 4 0,06 0,18 0,12 0,53 - - 0,06
1993 18 0,34 1 1 4 0,00 0,20 0,13 0,60 - - 0,07
1994 18 0,27 1 1 4 0,07 0,20 0,13 0,60 - - 0,00
1995 18 0,25 2 1 4 0,13 0,20 0,13 0,47 - - 0,07
1996 16 0,33 2 - - 0,14 0,21 0,14 0,43 - - -
1997 16 0,33 1 - - 0,15 0,23 0,15 0,46 - - -26
Figure 6. The turboprop network
With respect to the technological analysis it is evident from figure 7a and 7b that the picture is
quite different from the one observed in the jet. In fact in the turboprop industry many companies
follow separated technological trajectories and never approach the frontier. In the case of SFC, the
technological frontier moves downward discontinuously, some companies attempts to come near the
frontier with long lags with respect to the technological innovator, while other firms, including the
first mover and former relational leader Rolls Royce, never move towards the frontier and maintain
a stable horizontal trajectory. Allison, second mover at the birth of the industry, only innovates in
the 1990s becoming technological leader in terms of SFC. General Electric enters the industry
introducing an innovating product in the 1960s, while Pratt & Whitney slowly tends to come close
to the frontier, by introducing a number of innovative products but never producing a shift of the
technological frontier. After the 1980s all companies maintains stable trajectories.
The picture of the evolution of the Pressure Ratio is very similar, showing innovations by
General Electric and Pratt & Whitney approaching the frontier only in 1997, an innovation of
Allison in the 1990s and stable independent trajectories below the frontier for the other companies.
1960
RR AE


































































































































































































































At the cluster level the pattern is even more clear. In cluster 1 the first mover Rolls Royce, single
player at the birth of the industry, loses the technological leadership in SFC with the entry of the
second mover Allison. In 1965 General Electric enters the industry advancing the technological
frontier and a further advance occurs in the 1990s with the introduction of a new engine by Allison.
For the pressure ratio the pattern is similar, except for the presence of T values greater than 1 in the
1990s, due to the innovative entry of Pratt & Whitney in the cluster. It is worth noting that once an
innovation occurs, the distance from the frontier of the other actors increases and it is not observed a
subsequent process of coming up to the frontier, that is companies maintains their technological
output, enlarging the gap with the technological leader.
In cluster 2 the first movers Pratt & Whitney and Turbomeca are respectively ont he frontier of
PR and SFC. In SFC further technological advances are introduced by Pratt & Whitney and by
general Electric until the 1980s. In pressure ratio the pattern is similar, except for the innovative
entry of Garrett in the 1970s. The last decade has not been characterised by further innovations, but
by stable parallel positions of firms.
In both clusters we may observe that innovations are isolated and does not seem to influence
technological innovation of other companies. Moreover, there is not a single technological leader
over all the history, but technological competition is not very intense as, once the technological
leader is replaced, actors do not imitate the innovator trying to approach the frontier.
The structure of vertical relations suggests that technological learning occurs in single, one-to-
one relations. The existence of a number of partitions in the network, and within of one-to-one
relations within partitions, favour the development of separated technological trajectories not in
competition among them. For suppliers with a few relations, the opportunities of learning from
heterogeneity are limited. Moreover the potential for spillovers almost does not exist, as customers
in single sourcing do not have the opportunities for developing “experienced” specification
capabilities and cannot act as bridges for the transfer of knowledge across suppliers. Even when
customers are in dual sourcing theirircraft programs are in single sourcing and again the
opportunities for spillovers are reduced.
Finally, single sourcing does not generate strong incentives to technological innovation for
suppliers, as the intensity of competition is lower.
For suppliers having multiple relations, the opportunities of learning from heterogeneity are more
pronounced, although learning is fragmented in separated relations with customers in single
sourcing.29
Figure 8. Index T – cluster 1, cluster 2




























































In summary, the empirical analysis detailed at the level of single technical parameters seems to
support the hypothesis of different intensity of technological competition in hierarchical and non
hierarchical networks. In hierarchical networks competition leads to lack of a single leader and to an
oligopoly shared among a number of large players. In partitioned networks there is also lack of a
single technological leader but the intensity of competition is much lower. While in the jet
independent trajectories are observed only for actors at the periphery of the network, such as Allison
and Textron, in the turboprop this happens for many companies, even having multiple relations and
larger shares of the market such as Rolls Royce.30
6.  Conclusions and further research
This paper represents an extension of previous research on the relation between network
structure and industrial dynamics in vertically-related sectors (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2001a,b). The
analysis of the processes of technological learning and of the technological positions of actors will
provide the basis for micro-foundations of models of interactions among heterogeneous vertically-
related actors, and for further specifying the role of demand in the dynamics of industries and
technologies.
The paper analyses quantitatively the micro-mechanisms of interactions between suppliers and
users and the technological competition among suppliers by focusing on direct measures of output
of the technological activity. In this work technological characteristics have been observed
separately, with the objective of understanding at a micro-level the possible different directions of
innovation pursued by different suppliers. Further research will aim at identifying the weights of
each parameters for their aggregation and at estimating a multiparameter technological frontier,
linking through specified functional forms technical and service characteristics of products. This is
the object of an ongoing research, carried out with the help of aeronautical engineers and technical
experts and managers of buyer companies
In this work we develop the empirical analysis of the jet aero-engine industry, which is
characterised by the emergence of a hierarchical structure of the network of vertical relations, and of
the turboprop industry, characterised by the presence of partitioned network with single and sparse
relations. The empirical analysis shows in details the differences in the innovating behaviour and in
the intensity of technological competition in the core and at the periphery of the network, and for
couples of vertically-related actors. Further research will analyse the relation between technological
competition and market performance.31
Appendix 1. Data and descriptive statistics of technical parameters and clusters
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of technical and service characteristics





AIR FLOW lb/sec 114 191.40 3214.20 998.07 683.66 0.724 0.226 0.131 0.449
LENGTH inch 114 56.81 204.02 128.85 27.043 0.310 0.226 0.310 0.449
DIAMETER inch 114 35.79 134.02 70.13 24.78 0.259 0.226 -1.184 0.449
WEIGHT-DRY lb 114 1282.60 16629.80 6320.60 3402.15 0.707 0.226 -0.017 0.449
THRUST T-O lb 114 6975.00 95175.00 34980.65 22571.55 0.777 0.226 -0.301 0.449
BPR 114 0.30 8.40 3.96 2.11 -0.534 0.226 -1.166 0.449
OPR 114 9.40 40.00 24.54 7.85 -0.083 0.226 -1.058 0.449
SFC T-O lb/hr/lb 114 0.32 0.90 0.43 0.13 1.522 0.226 1.595 0.449
TURBOPROP
LENGTH inch 76 42.99 145.20 87.75 18.3951 -0.026 0.276 2.036 0.545
WIDTH inch 76 19.02 45.31 30.63 7.3485 0.010 0.276 -1.106 0.545
WEIGHT-DRY lb 76 286.00 1753.40 980.20 362.92 -0.255 0.276 -.648 0.545
POWER T-O ehp 76 523.62 6185.69 2049.47 1043.02 1.918 0.276 5.487 0.545
PRESSURE RATIO 76 5.50 18.00 9.87 4.02 0.399 0.276 -1.048 0.545
SFC T-O lb/h/ehp 76 0.41 0.73 0.56 0.08 0.153 0.276 -1.327 0.545
Table A2. Descriptive statistics of service characteristics per cluster
Parameter Min Max Mean Std. Dev. n
JET
Cluster 1 BPR 0.3 6.6 3.12 2.34 67
OPR 9.4 33.9 20.68 7.18 67
SFC 0.32 0.90 0.49 0.15 67
Cluster 2 BPR 5 8.4 5.78 0.93 15
OPR 31.11 40 35.05 3.42 15
SFC 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.025 15
Cluster 3 BPR 4.1 6 4.88 0.50 32
OPR 21 35 27.69 3.76 32
SFC 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.01 32
TURBOPROP
Cluster 1 Pressure ratio 5.5 18 7.75 3.73 37
SFC 0.41 0.73 0.60 0.09 37
Cluster 2 Pressure ratio 5.83 18 11.87 3.20 39
SFC 0.45 0.65 0.52 0.06 3932
Table A3. Distribution of products in clusters - JET
Firm Product Cluster Firm Product Cluster
AE 3007A 1 RR SPEY 511 1
CI CFM56-2 1 RR SPEY 512 1
CI CFM56-2C1 1 RR SPEY 555-15 1
CI CFM56-3B 1 RR SPEY 555-15H 1
CI CFM56-3C 1 RR TAY 620-15 1
CI CFM56-5A 1 RR TAY 650-15 1
CI CFM56-5A1 1 RR TAY 651-54 1
CI CFM56-5A3 1 TX ALF502-R5 1
CI CFM56-5B 1 TX ALF507-1F 1
CI CFM56-5B1 1 TX ALF507-1H 1
CI CFM56-5B2 1 GE 90-92B 2
CI CFM56-5B3 1 GE CF6-80C2 2
CI CFM56-5B4 1 GE CF6-80E1 2
CI CFM56-5C2 1 PW 4074 2
CI CFM56-5C3 1 PW 4077 2
CI CFM56-5C4 1 PW 4090 2
CI CFM56-7B 1 PW 4164 2
GE CF34-3A1 1 PW 4168 2
GE CF34-3B1 1 PW 4360 2
IA V2500 1 RR Trent 768 2
IA V2522 1 RR Trent 772 2
IA V2525 1 RR Trent 875 2
IA V2527 1 RR Trent 877 2
IA V2528 1 RR Trent 884 2
IA V2530-A5 1 RR Trent 890 2
IA V2533-A5 1 GE CF6-45A2 3
PW JT3C 1 GE CF6-50C 3
PW JT3C-7 1 GE CF6-50C2 3
PW JT3D-3B 1 GE CF6-50E2 3
PW JT3D-3C 1 GE CF6-6D 3
PW JT3D-3D 1 GE CF6-80A 3
PW JT3D-7 1 GE CF6-80A2 3
PW JT4A 1 PW 2037 3
PW JT8D 1 PW 2040 3
PW JT8D-11 1 PW 4056 3
PW JT8D-15 1 PW 4060 3
PW JT8D-15A 1 PW 4152 3
PW JT8D-17 1 PW 4156 3
PW JT8D-17A 1 PW 4158 3
PW JT8D-17R 1 PW 4460 3
PW JT8D-217 1 PW JT9D-3A 3
PW JT8D-217A 1 PW JT9D-59A 3
PW JT8D-217C 1 PW JT9D-7 3
PW JT8D-219 1 PW JT9D-7A 3
PW JT8D-7 1 PW JT9D-7F 3
PW JT8D-7A 1 PW JT9D-7J 3
PW JT8D-7B 1 PW JT9D-7Q 3
PW JT8D-9 1 PW JT9D-7R4 3
PW JT8D-9A 1 PW JT9D-7R4E 3
RR AVON 527 1 RR RB211-22B 3
RR AVON 531B 1 RR RB211-524B 3
RR AVON 533R 1 RR RB211-524C 3
RR CONWAY 508 1 RR RB211-524D 3
RR CONWAY 509 1 RR RB211-524G 3
RR M45H 1 RR RB211-524H 3
RR SPEY 1 1 RR RB211-535C 3
RR SPEY 506 1 RR RB211-535E 333
Table A4. Distribution of products in clusters – TURBOPROP
Firm Product Cluster Firm Product Cluster
AE 2100 1 GA TPE331-10UG 2
AE 2100C 1 GA TPE331-12UAR 2
AE 501-D13 1 GA TPE331-14 2
AE 501-DB 1 GA TPE331-14HR 2
GE CT64-820-1 1 GA TPE331-5 2
GE CT64-820-4 1 GE CT7-5A2 2
PW 127B 1 GE CT7-7A 2
PW 127D 1 GE CT7-9B 2
PW 127F 1 GE CT7-9C 2
PW 150 1 GE CT7-9D 2
RR 506 1 PW 118 2
RR 511 1 PW 119 2
RR 512 1 PW 119C 2
RR 514 1 PW 120 2
RR 514-7 1 PW 120A 2
RR 514-7E 1 PW 121 2
RR 525 1 PW 121A 2
RR 525F 1 PW 123 2
RR 528-7E 1 PW 123B 2
RR 529-7E 1 PW 123C 2
RR 532-7 1 PW 123D 2
RR 532-7L 1 PW 124B 2
RR 532-7N 1 PW 125B 2
RR 532-7R 1 PW 126 2
RR 532-9 1 PW 127 2
RR 534-2 1 PW PT6A-20 2
RR 535-7R 1 PW PT6A-27 2
RR 536 1 PW PT6A-45 2
RR 536-2 1 PW PT6A-45R 2
RR 536-7 1 PW PT6A-50 2
RR 536-7P 1 PW PT6A-65A 2
RR 536-7R 1 PW PT6A-65B 2
RR 542-10 1 PW PT6A-65R 2
RR 542-10B 1 PW PT6A-67D 2
RR 542-10K 1 PW PT6A-67R 2
RR 542-4 1 TU BASTANVIC 2
WJ 5A-1 1 WA M-601D 2
GA TPE331-10R 2 WA M-601E 234
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